Thomas Ochs v. Reading Hospital by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-19-2016 
Thomas Ochs v. Reading Hospital 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Thomas Ochs v. Reading Hospital" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 395. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/395 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-2728 
______________ 
 
THOMAS OCHS; LAURA OCHS, H/W,  
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
READING HOSPITAL 
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 5-14-cv-04017) 
District Judge: Hon. J. William Ditter, Jr. 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 19, 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Thomas Ochs (“Ochs”) and his wife Laura Ochs (together, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Reading Hospital (“the hospital”) in their 
personal injury suit, challenging the District Court’s determination that the hospital was 
Ochs’s statutory employer under the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act 
(“PWCA”) and immune from suit.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I 
Ochs was a contractual employee of AMN Healthcare (“AMN”), a healthcare 
staffing company.  AMN placed Ochs at the hospital for a one-month period to assist the 
hospital in its transition to a new health record software platform called “Epic.”  The 
hospital assigned Ochs to a specific unit, selected his work schedule, and approved his 
timecards.  AMN paid Ochs, withheld taxes, and maintained workers’ compensation 
coverage.  Only AMN could terminate Ochs, but the hospital had the authority to remove 
him from his assignment if it was unsatisfied with his work.     
When Ochs began work at the hospital, he was required to attend a one-day 
orientation detailing hospital policies and procedures that consultants like Ochs were 
required to follow and two days of training on the hospital’s unique version of Epic, 
created and led by hospital employees.  Ochs had experience with Epic but acknowledged 
that this training was necessary because the hospital had customized the program.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Ochs was required to comply with a dress code and to wear a vest and badge 
bearing the hospital’s logo.  He reported directly to his assigned unit for his designated 
 3 
 
shift and was required to check in with a hospital supervisor.  Ochs typically spent time 
near the nurse’s station answering questions from hospital employees about how to use 
the new software.  While Ochs would approach hospital employees who were “looking 
confused,” he was also directed by hospital supervisors to assist specific employees.  
App. 39.  An AMN liaison was on-site at the hospital to answer administrative questions 
from the consultants at the beginning of each shift, but no AMN representative 
supervised Ochs’s daily activities.  Epic-trained hospital employees were also available to 
answer substantive questions from AMN consultants such as Ochs about the hospital’s 
Epic program.  
Several days after starting at the hospital, Ochs tripped and fell on steps at the 
hospital and was injured.  Plaintiffs sued the hospital alleging negligence.  The District 
Court granted the hospital’s summary judgment motion, reasoning that the hospital was 
immune from suit under the PWCA because it controlled the relevant aspects of Ochs’s 
work, and hence was his employer.  Plaintiffs appeal. 
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II1 
 The District Court correctly concluded that Ochs was a “borrowed servant” as a 
matter of law, making the hospital his employer under the PWCA and thus statutorily 
immune from suit.   
 Employees who are injured at work are limited to the compensation available to 
them under the PWCA and cannot separately sue their employers for personal injury.  
See 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 481(a) (2002) (“[L]iability of an employer under this act shall be 
exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees[.]”).  This 
immunity from suit extends from the direct employer to another entity that has 
“borrowed” the employee if the latter exercises sufficient control over the employee.  See 
Claudio v. MGS Mach. Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  According to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,  
[t]he test for determining whether a servant furnished by one person to 
another becomes the employee of the person to whom he is loaned is 
whether he passes under the latter’s right of control with regard not only to 
the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it. . . . Other 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007).  In 
doing so, we apply the same standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making 
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 
418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient 
evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant.  Kaucher v. 
Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
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factors which may be relevant include the right to select and discharge the 
employee and the skill or expertise required for the performance of the 
work.  
 
JFC Temps, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lindsay), 680 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa. 
1996) (internal citations omitted).  “Although opinions . . . frequently mention such items 
as which employer actually hired the servant, and which paid his wages . . . these are 
peripheral matters and not controlling.”  Wilkinson v. K-Mart, 603 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992); see also JFC Temps, 680 A.2d at 864 (“The payment of wages may be 
considered, but is not a determinative factor.”).  The central inquiry is who has the right 
to control and direct the manner of the employee’s work. 
 The undisputed facts here demonstrate that the hospital had the right to, and did, 
control the manner of Ochs’s daily work.  While Plaintiffs argue that Ochs could be 
viewed as “directing Reading Hospital’s staff” rather than the other way around due to 
his teaching role, Appellants’ Br. at 15, this ignores the many ways in which the hospital 
directed Ochs’s activities.  The hospital trained Ochs and could choose to terminate his 
assignment there.  Ochs reported to hospital personnel on a daily basis who instructed 
him on when and where to work, required him to abide by hospital policies, dictated his 
dress code, and directed him to assist specific hospital staff in using the hospital’s 
customized software.  Such facts are typically sufficient to establish control over the 
manner of an employee’s work.  See, e.g., Claudio, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (applying 
borrowed servant doctrine where employer assigned work location and specific jobs to 
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employee, provided training, dictated the dress code, required he wear identification 
badge with its logo, and “could  . . . end [his] assignment . . . if dissatisfied with his 
work”); O’Donnell v. New England Motor Freight, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-1068, 2009 WL 
674131, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009) (applying doctrine where employee “reported to” 
employer, “used equipment supplied by” it, and employer determined his work hours and 
assignments, approved time cards, and could “terminate his assignment”), aff’d, 373 F. 
App’x 182 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential); Zaragoza v. BASF Const. Chems., LLC, 
No. 08-96, 2009 WL 260772, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2009) (applying doctrine where 
employee reported directly to the employer daily, received training, hours, and work 
assignments from its personnel, used its equipment, and wore name badge with its logo).  
These undisputed facts show that the hospital controlled the work that Ochs performed 
and the manner in which he performed it. 
 Moreover, there is no dispute that AMN did not provide ongoing direction to 
Ochs.  AMN’s “largest responsibility in relation to [Ochs’s] work was his placement in 
the services of [the hospital].  After placement, at no point did [it] purport to instruct 
[Ochs] on how he should carry out his work assignments[.]”  Id. at *5.  In fact, the 
interaction between Ochs and AMN was limited to an initial screening phone call with a 
recruiter, selecting him to work at the hospital, exchanging employment paperwork, 
paying his wages, and supplying insurance.  These facts show the limited role AMN 
played in Ochs’s work for the hospital.  See JFC Temps, 680 A.2d at 866 (citing fact that 
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staffing agency “did not instruct [the employee] regarding the performance of his work[ ] 
. . . [and] had no substantial contact with [him] other than processing his paycheck.”).   
That AMN had the exclusive ability to discipline and terminate him also does not 
undermine the fact that the hospital exercised day-to-day control over the manner of 
Ochs’s work.  See Claudio, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 582-83 (staffing agency’s role in hiring 
employee, paying his salary and workmen’s compensation benefits, and its sole ability to 
discipline or terminate him, were “of limited weight” in the analysis).   
 While AMN’s contract with the hospital specified that consultants provided under 
the agreement would “for the purposes of th[e] Agreement, be considered employees of” 
AMN, App. 19, “[i]t is well settled under Pennsylvania law that parties are not bound by 
their characterization of the employee-employer relationship.”  Zaragoza, 2009 WL 
260772, at *4 (citing Red Line Exp. Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Price), 588 
A.2d 90 (Pa. 1991)); see also Wilkinson, 603 A.2d at 662 (although contract indicated 
that logistics company lending drivers remained their employer, this was outweighed by 
the reality of the receiving company’s control over the drivers).  The facts show Ochs 
was loaned to the hospital as a borrowed servant and it was his employer under the 
PWCA. 
 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Williams v. Delta Truck Body Co., does not change the 
result.  In Williams, this Court examined whether a highly skilled specialist who required 
no training to perform his duties should be viewed as “independent of the putative 
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borrowing employer’s control.”  892 F.2d 327, 328 (3d. Cir. 1989).  The significance of 
an employee’s special expertise has since diminished under Pennsylvania law.  Seven 
years after Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has suggested that an employee’s 
status as a specialist is not determinative of whether he is a borrowed servant, but rather 
is a factor to consider in determining the presence of the requisite control.  JFC Temps, 
680 A.2d at 866 (declining to adopt a blanket rule that exempts specialized employees 
from the borrowed servant doctrine).   
 Moreover, even if it remains unaffected by JFC Temps, Williams is inapposite.  
Williams, a computer expert placed in charge of a company’s financial computer 
operations, claimed that “he required no specialized training at the assignment site[,] . . . 
was the only one at [the site] capable of running the computer program and did so based 
on his own experience.”  Williams, 892 F.2d at 331.  In contrast, Ochs acknowledges that 
he received several days of training on hospital procedures and the hospital’s specific 
implementation of Epic, and hospital employees familiar with the hospital’s customized 
Epic software were available to answer Ochs’s questions.  See JFC Temps, 680 A.2d at 
865 (temporary driver who already possessed driving skills was still subject to control 
because employer directed him in how to go about making deliveries, required him to 
check in daily, completed his time sheets, and evaluated his performance).  Thus, any 
pre-existing expertise Ochs may have had does not alter the conclusion that the hospital 
had the right to control the manner of his work. 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to Reading Hospital. 
